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ABSTRACT
A game process is a system where the decisions of one agent can
influence the decisions of other agents. In the real world, social
influences and relationships between agents may influence the
decision makings of agents with game behaviors. And in turn, this
also gives us the possibility to mine some information from such
agents, such as the relationships between them, by the interactions
in a game process. In this paper, we propose a Game Generative
Network (GGN) framework which utilizes the deviation between
the real game outcome and the ideal game model to build networks
for game processes, which opens a door for understanding more
about agents with game behaviors by graph mining approaches. We
apply GGN to the team game as a concrete application and conduct
experiments on relationship inference tasks.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the real world, there are a variety of systems with coopera-
tion and competition behaviors among agents. Such behaviors are
usually modeled as games where the decisions of one agent can
influence the decisions of other agents [16, 18]. Game theory is
devoted to the logic of decision making in multi-agent interactions.
However, most existing game-theoretic models either ignore the
social influences and relationships between agents or do not con-
sider such information comprehensively. Besides, such information
of agents is difficult to obtain and hard to characterize due to the
complexity of social behaviors. If we want to better understand
agents with game behaviors, it is necessary for us to mine the social
influences and relationships between them. Also, by incorporating
such information, it is possible for us to build game models that
better characterize agents’ real game behaviors.
On the other hand, the pattern of connections and relationships
between objects in a system can be represented as a network [17],
where the objects correspond to nodes and the relationships be-
tween objects correspond to edges. A game is a system of multiple
agents with special relationships, either explicit or implicit. Thus it
is possible for us to generate a network for a game process and mine
the relationships between agents on the network. Besides, although
there are a large number of studies on social network mining, none
can be directly applied to social agents with game behaviors. Gen-
erating networks for game processes no doubt will open a door for
mining information from agents with game behaviors.
Besides, relationships between agents in game processes are
usually more complex than common relationships modeled by tra-
ditional networks. In addition to positive relationships, theremay be
also some negative relationships between agents in a game system,
which greatly influence the strategies taken by agents. In a game
process, positive and negative relationships reflect inmany different
ways. For instance, a positive relationship may represent friend-
ship, cooperation, trust or win-win and a negative relationship may
represent hostility, competition, distrust or loss-loss [2, 8, 19]. Com-
pared to traditional networks that reduce the relationships between
objects as simple pairwise links, signed networks [23] in which the
weights of edges can be positive and negative are better to represent
such positive and negative relationships between agents in game
processes.
Based on the above considerations, we propose a general Game
Generative Network (GGN) framework, which generates signed
networks for game processes based on the deviation between the
real game outcome and the ideal game model. Our assumption
for such games is that if there are some relationships between
agents, the relationships will affect the strategies the agents take. In
general, GGN severs as an intermediary between game processes
and graph mining approaches. In this paper, we mainly focus on
the relationship inference tasks. We give a simple illustration of the
Prisoners’ Dilemma [20]. Besides, we introduce a mining approach
for GGN and apply it to infer the relationships between social
agents in team games.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We appear to be the first to mine positive and negative rela-
tionships between social agents with game behaviors from
game processes.
• We propose a Game Generative Network framework to gen-
erate networks for game processes, which serves as an in-
termediary between game processes and graph mining ap-
proaches and opens a door for mining information from
agents with game behaviors.
• We study the problem of team game and apply our frame-
work to infer the relationships between agents in such games.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2,
we briefly review some related work. In Section 3, we describe the
background and the framework of GGN. In Section 4, we introduce
the relationship inference task and the mining approach for GGN.
In Section 5, we give the definition of team game and conduct some
experiments by using GGN. In Section 6, we conclude and highlight
some promising directions for future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
Our work presents a brand new idea of generating signed networks
for game processes and applying graph mining to social individuals
with game behaviors by using the generated networks. Basically,
our work is related to social network analysis [21, 24] and game
theory [16, 18]. There are a lot of studies on social network dis-
covery, such as link analysis [7, 13] and community detection [6].
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Although there are some research [3] applying game-theoretic mod-
els to graph mining, no one, in turn, applies graph mining to game
systems. In addition, some work [5] conducts relationship inference
tasks on various social networks and some work [1, 4] studies the
cooperation and competition among agents in game theory, but
none can infer the hidden relationships between agents with game
behaviors. Besides, due to the framework of GGN we designed,
our work has a strong connection with graph mining methods on
signed networks [10–12, 23, 25].
Quite recently, Serrino et al. [22] train a multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning agent to find friend and foe in The Resistance: Avalon,
a hidden role game played by several players. But their model is just
designed for similar hidden role games with several players, and
can not be applied to infer the relationships between a large number
of social individuals with game behaviors. Thus the problem solved
in their work is somewhat narrower than the problem investigated
in this paper.
3 GAME GENERATIVE NETWORK
3.1 Background
Game Theory. Game theory is a tool to analyze decision making
in multi-agent interactions. Based on different analyzing methods,
there are different types of game models designed for different
specific games. Since game models are not the most important part
in this work and describing them systematically will take up a lot
of space, we aim at introducing basic concept of game theory here
and extending some theories in the following sections. A game
denoted as Γ usually includes three parts: the set of agents P, the
strategy space S, and the utility function u : S → R. If the number
of agents in a game is n, we call it n-agent or n-player game. A
(pure) Nash equilibrium in an n-agent game is a list of strategies
s∗ = {s∗1 , s∗2 , . . . , s∗n } such that
s∗i = argmax
si
ui (s∗1 , s∗2 , . . . , si , . . . , s∗n ), (1)
where si is the strategy taken by agent pi . In other words, Nash
equilibrium is a stable strategy list that neigher agent can increase
her payoff by taking another strategy, thus no agent will try to
change her strategy.
Signed Network. A signed network is defined as a graph G(V, E,w),
where V is the node set, E is the edge set, and w : E → R is a
weight mapping function associated with each edge and the weight
can be positive or negative.
3.2 A Special Case: Dynamic Game
We first study a special type of game named dynamic game. Dy-
namic game is a kind of game in which decisions of agents are made
at various times with some of the earlier decisions being public
knowledge when the later decisions are being made. Here we con-
sider then-agent dynamic gamewith agent setP = {p1,p2, . . . ,pn },
where each agent has multiple opportunities to change her strate-
gies and the payoff updates after each strategy changes.
In order to involve the interactions between agents, we build
a network with node set V = P. The original strategy list of
each agent at time t − 1 is s = {s1, s2, . . . , si , . . . , sn }. At time t ,
agent pi change her strategy from si to s ′i , which converts s to
s′ = {s1, s2, . . . , s ′i , . . . , sn }. Since the strategies made by agents in
dynamic games are based on some public knowledge, agents are
aware of others’ strategies and canmake decisions according to such
knowledge. Thus relationships between agents may be reflected
dynamically in such interactions, which is a key to build the edges
between agents. Based on this consideration, we use the utility
difference before and after the conversion of each agent to build
the edges of the network, the weight of each edge is formulated as
follows:
w(e(t )i, j ) = uj (s′) − uj (s), (2)
where uj (s) is the utility of agent pj with strategy list s, and e(t )i, j is
the directed edge from pi to pj built at time t . Repeating the above
process for T times, we will end up with a directed signed network
containing the interactive information of agents.
3.3 General Game Generative Network
Framework
For the special case in the previous section, it is natural to generate
networks. However, many times we cannot get the whole game
process. This is to say, in a real game, we may only get the final
outcome, i.e., the real strategies taken by agents. Besides, such dy-
namic games are not universal. So a more general game generative
network framework is needed.
Most existing game-theoretic models assume that all the agents
are in selfish behaviors, where each agent aims at maximizing her
own utility. Such assumptions ignore social influences and rela-
tionships between agents. Besides, sometimes relationships among
agents will cause a deviation in the utility of each agent. On one
hand, most game models either do not consider relationships be-
tween agents or do not consider such information comprehensively.
One the other hand, such information of agents is also difficult to
obtain and hard to characterize by computing models.
In order to generate networks for game processes, one practical
approach is to use the deviation between the real game outcome and
the ideal game model. As discussed above, an ideal game model is
based on the assumptions that each agent is selfish and usually does
not consider the complete relationships between agents, but the
real outcome does not follow such assumptions and reflects some
unobserved relationships. For instance, from an idea game model,
we may find that both agent p1 and agent p2 can achieve a higher
payoff by reducing the other’s payoff, but the real outcome shows
that they did not do so (wewill use Prisoners’ Dilemma as a concrete
example in the following section). This may be because there is a
positive relationship between them, and such a relationship will be
reflected in the deviation between the real game outcome and the
ideal game model.
Assume the real strategy list is sr = {sr1 , sr2 , . . . , sri , . . . , srn }. For
agent pi , we can predict the strategy s∗i taken by pi from an ideal
game model. By replacing sri with s
∗
i , we get a new strategy list
s′ = {sr1 , sr2 , . . . , s∗i , . . . , srn }. And then we use the utility difference
before and after the conversion of each agent to build the edges of
the network, the weight of each edge is formulated as follows:
w(ei, j ) = uj (sr ) − uj (s′). (3)
There are two ways to choose s∗i : one way is to use the strategy
in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. If there are multiple pure
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Figure 1: The illustration of Prisoners’ Dilemma.
strategy Nash equilibria, we can also build multiple networks. But
the concern is that the Nash equilibrium may be hard to find and
pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist in some cases. The
second way is to choose the strategy that maximizes the utility of
pi as follows:
s∗i = argmax
s#i
ui (sr1 , sr2 , . . . , s#i , . . . , srn ). (4)
Based on the above framework, we can generate signed networks
for most game processes, which are named as Game Generative
Networks (GGNs) in this paper.
4 RELATIONSHIP INFERENCE ON GAME
GENERATIVE NETWORK
Relationship inference aims to infer the relationships between
agents. And specifically, in this paper, we aim at judging whether
the relationship between two agents in a game is positive or nega-
tive. In some games, the relationships between agents may influence
agents’ decision makings. For instance, some positive relationships
(e.g., friendship, cooperation, trust, and win-win) and negative re-
lationships (e.g., hostility, competition, distrust or loss-loss) may
be involved in game processes, and the utilities of agents are af-
fected by such relationships. But most of the time, we have no
knowledge about relationships between agents or the signs of such
relationships. Thus relationship inference on social agents with
game behaviors is quite interesting and useful if we want to under-
stand more about agents’ behaviors and the relationships between
agents.
4.1 Prisoners’ Dilemma
Here we give a simple illustration of relationship inference based
on GGN, we study the famous problem of Prisoners’ Dilemma [20].
The problem is defined as follows: two criminals (p1 and p2) are
imprisoned and they cannot talk to each other. The police offer
each prisoner a bargain. Each prisoner is given the opportunity
either to keep quiet (Q) or to squeal (S). The payoff table of these
two criminals is shown in Fig. 1 (left). For instance, if p1 chooses
strategy S and p2 chooses strategy Q, p1 will be released and p2 will
be imprisoned for 5 years.
In the ideal game model where the relationship between these
two agents is ignored, Nash equilibrium of Prisoners’ Dilemma
is that both criminals choose to squeal thus both of them will be
imprisoned for 4 years. But if we consider the relationship between
p1 and p2, the real strategies they take may not be consistent with
the Nash equilibrium of an ideal model.
For example, suppose that the real outcome of the Prisoners’
Dilemma game happens as follows: p1 chooses to keep quiet and
p2 chooses to squeal. Based on the framework of GGN, we can
generate a network of p1 and p2 in Fig. 1 (upper right). For example,
w(e1,2) = u2({Q, S}) −u2({S, S}) = 0− (−4) = 4. From the network,
we can conclude that p1 has a positive relationship to p2, that is p1
is doing favor towards p2. Another possible situation is that both p1
and p2 keep quiet. From the GGN illustrated in Fig. 1 (lower right),
we can conclude that there is a strong relationship between p1 and
p2 so that they believe in each other. These examples illustrate that
GGNs can be useful to capture the relationships between agents.
4.2 Mining Approach
For small GGNs (e.g., n ≤ 10), we can mine the relationships be-
tween agents by observation or simple statistical analysis. For big
GGNs, graph mining approaches are needed. From our definition
above, a GGN is essentially a signed network. With such cognition,
the problem of mining for GGNs is indeed the problem of mining
for signed networks [10, 11, 23]. Since the focus of this paper is on
exploring the capabilities of GGN, we design a relatively simple
and intuitive method to mine for GGN and observe the power of
GGN by using this method.
The most direct relationship between agents in GGNs is the
first-order proximity. For each pair linked by an edge eu,v with
weight wuv , if wuv > 0, eu,v represents a positive relationship
from u to v; if wuv < 0, eu,v represents a negative relationship
from u to v; otherwise, there is no first-order proximity between
u and v represented by eu,v . Since not all the edges generated are
meaningful, we should filter out some edges based on specific cases.
For instance, given a relationship network of agents, we have the
prior knowledge about whether two agents know each other, thus
the edges beyond the edges in the relationship network, including
self-loops, should be filtered out.
Besides, the first-order proximity cannot represent all relation-
ships between agents, and because the behaviors of agents are not
fully reflected in a game, some edges may be missed. Based on the
multiplicative transitivity [10] of signed networks, if there is an
edge with weightwuv between u and v , and there is an edge with
weightwvx betweenv and x , then there may be a hidden third edge
with weightwuv ·wvx between u and x . Multiplicative transitivity
is proved by the fact that two agents connected by an even number
of negative edges can be considered balance [9].
Based on the multiplicative transitivity, we introduce the ex-
ponential kernel to evaluate the kth-order relationships between
agents. The kth-order exponential kernel is defined as the weighted
sum of matrix powers, where the weight decays with the inverse
factorial:
expk (A) =
k∑
i=0
1
i!A
i . (5)
The sign of the (i, j)-th entry of the exponential kernel indicates
the positive or negative relationship from i to j. The greater the
absolute value, the stronger the relationship. Combining with the
generative process of GGN, the process of relationship inference
by GGN is illustrated in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2: The process of relationship inference by GGN, where GGN serves as an intermediary that combines game processes
and graph mining approaches. The color of positive edges in the GGN is red and the color of negative edges is blue.
5 GAME GENERATIVE NETWORK FOR TEAM
GAME
In this section, we will show how to apply GGN to the team game
as a concrete application. The goal of a team game is to divide n
agents into small groups. The utility of each agent in a team game
is affected by the relationships between agents. Relationships be-
tween agents in team games have a broad definition. For instance,
a positive or negative relationship can represent a friend or a foe
relation between two agents. In this case, everyone wants to team
up with her best friends and tries not to team up with those she dis-
likes. One the other hand, relationships in team games can evaluate
whether the cooperation between two agents will bring positive
(win-win) or negative (loss-loss) effects. And in this case, everyone
wants to team up with a group of agents that make her obtain the
biggest profits.
5.1 Team Game Definition
In this section, we design an ideal game model for the team game.
Consider an undirected signed network G(V, E,w) with the node
(agent) setV , the edge set E and the weightw(e) associated with
each edge e . In our settings here, team game aims to find a set of
teams and each node has one and only one team, and we use t(i) to
denote the team which node i belongs to. The strategy of agent i is
to quit the current team t(i) and join a new team t ′(i).
From the above analysis we can conclude that each agent wants
to team with those agents who have positive relationships with her,
thus we define the gain function as follows:
дi (s) =
n∑
j=1, j,i
Ai jδ (i, j), (6)
where n is the number of nodes, Ai j is the (i, j)-th entry of the
weighted adjacent matrix A of the signed network G(V, E,w)
above, and δ (i, j) is an indicator function which is equal to 1 when
t(i) = t(j) and 0 otherwise.
However, when most of the relationships of agents are positive,
such gain function will lead to a trival solution where all the agents
form a single team. To solve this problem, we consider that the
number of members in each group should be as balanced as possible,
which is consistent with the fact that a team with a large size will
weaken the relationships. To this end, we define the loss function
Algorithm 1: Team Game(G)
Initialize each node to a singleton team;
while not converge do
Random shuffle the nodes;
for i from 1 to n do
si = argmaxs∗i ui ({s1, s2, . . . , s
∗
i , . . . , sn });
Node i joins the new team by taking strategy si ;
Table 1: Statistics of the datasets.
Datasets Nodes Edges + edges - edges
Slashdot1 3,869 93,498 77,052 16,446
Slashdot2 3,872 27,298 20,134 7,164
Epinions1 6,605 182,674 158,170 24,504
Epinions2 6,591 36,992 32,832 4,160
as li (s) = c |t(i)|, where |t(i)| is the size of the team which agent i
belongs to and c is a parameter to balance the gain and the loss.
Finally, the utility of agent i with strategy list s is calculated as
follows:
ui (s) = дi (s) − li (s) =
n∑
j=1, j,i
Ai jδ (i, j) − c |t(i)|. (7)
5.2 Existence of Nash Equilibria
In this section, we will prove that the team game we designed is a
finite exact potential game which always possesses pure strategy
Nash equilibria [15]. Firstly, let us recall the definition of the exact
potential game. A game is an exact potential game if there exists an
associated potential function Φ(·) defined on the strategy profiles
that satisfies Φ(s ′i , s−i ) − Φ(si , s−i ) = ui (s ′i , s−i ) − ui (si , s−i ) for
every strategy profile s−i of all agents except agent i and every
strategy si of agent i . In an exact potential game that contains a
finite number of strategy profiles, Nash equilibria always exist. And
every better response in which each agent sequentially changes
her strategy to improve her own utility, will finally converge to a
Nash equilibrium [15].
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Theorem 1. The team game with utility function ui (·) is an exact
potential game with potential function Φ(s) = ∑ni=1 12 (дi (s) − li (s)).
Proof.
Φ(s ′i , s−i ) − Φ(si , s−i )
=
1
2 (
n∑
j=1, j,i
Ai j δˆ (i, j) −
n∑
j=1, j,i
Ai jδ (i, j))
− c2 ((|t
′(i)| + 1)2 + (|t(i)| − 1)2 − |t ′(i)|2 − |t(i)|2)
=дi (s ′i , s−i ) − дi (si , s−i ) − c(|t ′(i)| + 1) + c |t(i)|
=дi (s ′i , s−i ) − дi (si , s−i ) − li (s ′i , s−i ) + li (si , s−i )
=ui (s ′i , s−i ) − ui (si , s−i ).
□
The team game is a game with finite agents and finite strategy
space, so the team game with utility function ui (s) is a finite exact
potential game, thus possesses pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Based on the finite improvement property of potential game,
we propose an algorithm for computing the Nash equilibrium of
the ideal team game model, which is shown in Algorithm 1. We
firstly initialize each node to a singleton team and then repeat the
following process until the game converges: random shuffle the
nodes, and then let each node quit the current team and join the
team which maximizes her utility in the current state.
5.3 Experiments
In this section, we will show how to use GGN to conduct relation-
ship inference in team games.
5.3.1 Experimental Settings. Based on the fact that most of the
time we can only get the information that there is a relationship
between two agents, but we have no idea about which kind of
relationship (e.g., positive or negative) between them, we assume
that the network G we get of n agents is unsigned and unweighted,
where an edge betweenu andv means thatu andv know each other.
Given the network of the agents and the results of their decision
makings, we can build a network in the framework of GGN.
Based on the above considerations, we design the experiments
as follows: For a real network G′ which is signed and weighted, we
stimulate the team game on G′ and generate teaming results which
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Figure 4: Average accuracy of relationship inference in the
team game.
can be considered as the real strategies the agents take. We use the
teaming results and the ideal team game model on G (without G′)
to generate GGN and calculate the kth-order exponential kernel of
the GGN to infer the relationships. Since G′ is the real network, the
weighted adjacency matrix of G′ represents the real relationships
between agents, which gives us a way to evaluate the accuracy of
the relationship inference.
Here we should clarify that in the real world, the strategies taken
by agents are influenced by very complicated factors, which are
impossible to be modeled perfectly. Besides, not all agents will take
the optimal strategy in a game. So in our experiments, we simplify
the real-world situations, but this does not make a difference in
our evaluation, for the purpose of this work is to propose a game
generative network framework and see how powerful it is.
We extract four datasets from Slashdot and Epinions [10, 12, 14]
(two from each one). Slashdot is a technology news website that lets
users tag other users as friends and foes and Epinions is a product
review website where users build links that indicate trust or distrust
about other users. In order to make the team game converge, we
build the network with undirected edges. The statistics of these
datasets are listed in Table 1.
5.3.2 Case Study. We use Zachary’s Karate Club network [26] as
a toy example in our experiments. Zachary’s Karate Club is a well-
known social network of a university karate club with 34 nodes and
78 edges. We assume that node 23 has negative relationships with
all her neighbors and all other relationships are positive, which
leads to the outcome that no one wants to team with node 23. We
stimulate the game process and generate the GGN. The structure
of the real network and the generated GGN are shown in Fig. 3.
From the snapshot of the GGN in Fig. 3(b), we find that node 25,
27, 29 have first-order negative relationships to node 23, and node
24, 26 have second-order negative relationships to node 23, which
is consistent with the real network.
5.3.3 Relationship Inference for Team Game. In this section, we
evaluate the performance of mining on GGN in the relationship
inference tasks. Since the number of positive edges and negative
edges is not balanced in our datasets, we use average accuracy (the
average accuracy of each class) as the evaluation metric. We set
c = 0.2 for the team game process and k = 2 for the kth-order
exponential kernel in our graph mining approach. We stimulate
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Figure 5: Results of relationship inference in the team game when c = 0.2.
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Figure 6: Results of relationship inference in the team game when c = 0.3.
the team game for 5 times, the average accuracy values are shown
in Fig. 4. Here we should mention that our task is brand new and
there is no baseline that uses the game outcome, i.e., the strategies
taken by agents, as input to infer the relationships between agents,
so only random guessing can be compared in our experiments.
From the results shown in Fig. 4, we have several observations.
First, the prediction based on the GGN framework far outperforms
random guessing, which indicates the feasibility of our model for
mining the hidden relationships among agents with game behaviors.
Second, comparing with Slashdot1 and Epinions1, Slashdot2 and
Epinions2 are sparser, and the average accuracies of Slashdot2
and Epinions2 are higher than those of Slashdot1 and Epinions1
respectively. This is because, in the team game, the complexity
of strategies taken by users is related to the complexity of their
relationships, a sparser network means that users’ strategies are
easier to understand, which is compatible with our results.
We also conduct experiments on team game with different c
values by different kth-order exponential kernels. The results are
shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, where predictive percentage is the pro-
portion of non-zero values in the predicted edges. From the results,
we find that k = 2 is a good trade-off point with relatively high
average accuracy and prediction percentage in most cases. Besides,
according to the predictive percentages, we find that only a rel-
atively small percentage of relationships could be predicted in a
game process. This is because only a small part of relationships
is reflected in a single game, and it is still very valuable to infer
these relationships to understand this part of agents. In conclusion,
the results demonstrate the feasibility of our GGN framework on
mining relationships between agents with game behaviors.
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel game generative network frame-
work to build networks for game systems, which is a brand new
combination of game theory and graph mining. In general, GGN
severs as an intermediary between game processes and graph min-
ing approaches, which provides a new way to model and mine
relationships between social agents with game behaviors. To show
how to use GGN to mine the information of the hidden real net-
works, we introduce the team game as a concrete application and
conduct experiments on it. Indeed, there are some more possible
applications of the game generative network, such as mining the
features of agents by using advanced technologies, e.g., graph neu-
ral network (GNN) based deep learning models. For future work, we
plan to further improve the game generative network framework
and apply it to more real applications.
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